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Puerto Rico . . .  
Always the hurricanes blowing,  
Always the population growing.  
And the babies crying,  
And the bullets flying.  
I like to be in America! 




  Latin America and the Caribbean have among the highest emigration rates in the 
developing world.  In 2000, 3.8% of the region’s population was living in high-income 
countries in North America, Europe, or Asia, compared with emigration rates of 3.0% in 
the Middle East and North Africa, 2.5% in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 0.7% in 
Asia and the Pacific, and 0.6% in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Table 1).
1
  In this paper, we examine the contribution of demographic changes, geographic 
distance, and economic and political shocks in driving emigration from Latin America 
and the Caribbean.  What makes the region an interesting case is not just the scale of 
emigration, but also its concentration.  As of 2000, just four countries – the US, Canada, 
the UK, and Spain – were host to 75.4% of the region’s emigrants (see Table 2).  The 
concentration of migration flows to proximate high-income countries (the US) and 
countries with a shared colonial heritage (Canada, the UK, Spain) helpfully simplifies 
  While Mexican 
migration to the US captures most of the attention, it is by no means the only significant 
flow in the region.  There are also sizable flows from the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, and Haiti to the US; Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago to Canada 
and the UK; and Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador to Spain (Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2008).   
                                                 
1 All rates are for emigration from developing countries in a particular region to high-income countries.  
Among developing-country regions, total emigration rates are highest in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(as seen in Table 1), largely because of the exodus of individuals (including ethnic Russians) from Former 
Soviet Union countries to Russia following the breakup of the Soviet Union.   2 
both the measurement and analysis of international labor movements.
2
Among the four main destination countries, there are sharp differences in how 
immigration policy treats prospective entrants with regards to skill, refugee status, and 
country of origin.  These differences are important in light of the low skill levels of most 
Latin American emigrants, the propensity of the region for civil and military conflict, and 
the variation in countries’ colonial history.  In the US, nearly half of immigration from 
Latin America is undocumented, with government enforcement only partially impeding 
the inflow of illegal migrants (Hanson, 2006).
   
3  Permissiveness toward illegal entry 
creates ample opportunity for low skilled immigration.  Canada’s remoteness keeps most 
of its immigration legal.
4  The country uses a point system to regulate labor inflows, 
which heavily favors skilled applicants, while also allotting slots to refugees and asylees.  
In 2000, visas to skilled workers accounted for 58% of legal immigrant inflows in 
Canada, compared with 13% in the US (OECD, 2004).  Outside of EU members, the UK 
restricts immigration, with exceptions for skilled workers, family members of UK 
citizens, certain Commonwealth citizens, and asylum seekers.  The country also has low 
levels of illegal immigration compared to the US.
5  In Spain, large scale immigration is a 
recent phenomenon.  Agreements with former colonies have enabled individuals from 
these countries to enter Spain, with many ultimately obtaining work permits.
6
    Surging emigration from Latin America is due in part to the high frequency of 
 
                                                 
2 Current and former French and Dutch territories in Latin America and the Caribbean (French Guiana, 
Guadalupe, Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, and Suriname) have high emigration rates to France and the 
Netherlands, but are too small to obtain age-specific emigration rates, as is necessary for our analysis. 
3 Throughout the paper we use Latin America to refer to Latin America and the Caribbean. 
4 In 2002, for instance, Canada apprehended 9,500 illegal immigrants, compared to over 1 million in the US 
(OECD, 2004). 
5 In 2001, the UK found and removed 45,000 illegal immigrants from within its borders (OECD, 2004). 
6 As distinct from the US, Spain has frequently regularized illegal immigrants in the country, facilitating 
their access to work permits (Dolado and Velasquez, 2007).    3 
negative wage shocks in the region.  Over the last three decades, much of Latin America 
has experienced a demographic bulge, with large numbers of young people coming of 
working age and entering the labor force (Birdsall, Kelley, and Sinding, 2001).  One 
would expect this increase in the region’s relative labor supply to have put downward 
pressure on local wages and raised the incentive to emigrate.  In some Latin American 
countries, birth rates have begun to drop sharply (Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996), but in 
others they are declining only slowly.  While fertility rates in Mexico are on track to drop 
below replacement level by 2020 (Tuiran et al., 2002), they remain high in much of 
Central America and the Andes.  Cross-national differences in fertility are useful 
empirically for isolating the effects of labor supply on emigration. 
Macroeconomic instability associated with balance of payments crises, civil and 
military conflict, and natural disasters are other factors reducing wages and contributing 
to emigration from Latin America.  While there is extensive literature on how such 
shocks have affected the region’s growth performance (e.g., Collier et al., 2003; Raddatz, 
2007; Edwards, 2008), much less work examines their importance for labor movements 
in the hemisphere.  Our approach is to estimate how labor supply and demand shocks at 
the time a cohort enters the labor market affect initial and subsequent emigration.  Since 
individuals are most mobile when they are young, shocks at the time of labor market 
entry may have long lasting effects on migration.  Much of the work on the relationship 
between income and international migration considers the contemporaneous correlation 
between living standards and labor flows.
7
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007), Mayda (2009), and Ortega and Peri (2009), and Hanson 
(2009) for a review of recent literature. 
  By identifying how shocks to young cohorts 
affect migration over the mobile period of their working lives, we provide a dynamic   4 
account of how events in origin countries affect international migration.  Linking changes 
in labor supply to particular birth cohorts requires that we aggregate across skill levels (in 
order to successfully track origin country cohorts across both time and national borders), 
preventing us from accounting for migrant self-selection, the subject of much recent 
literature (see, e.g., Hanson, 2010).  The payoff is that we are able to examine 
international migration over several decades and exploit sizable cross-country variation in 
how the demographic transition to lower fertility affects subsequent labor supply growth. 
Related literature includes Hanson and McIntosh (2010), who find that variation 
in labor supply across Mexican regions accounts for nearly a third of regional variation in 
Mexican emigration rates, and Clark, Hatton, and Williamson (2007), who find that 
countries with larger populations of young people have higher rates of legal migration to 
the US.  Because both papers examine a single destination – the United States – they are 
silent on how variation in receiving country immigration policy affects the sensitivity of 
migration to events in sending countries, a feature that is central to our analysis.  Mayda 
(2009) and Ortega and Peri (2009) find that tightening immigration policy reduces 
bilateral migration flows.  Still unknown is how immigration policy affects the 
responsiveness of migration flows to different types of shocks. 
  To preview our results, we find that migration rates to the US are more sensitive 
to fluctuations in relative birth cohort size (i.e., to labor supply shocks), but less sensitive 
to origin-country civil conflict than is migration to the other destinations.  The raw effect 
of distance as well as its interaction with birth cohort size is most pronounced in 
migration to the US.  The findings suggest that migration from Latin America to the 
United States is responsive to labor market shocks that affect origin country relative   5 
wages.  The responsiveness and distance dependence of US labor inflows to economic 
shocks in Latin America reflects the importance of illegal labor movements in regional 
migration to the US, as these flows are largely mediated by market mechanisms. 
The results for migration to Canada, the UK, and Spain are quite different, with  
migration rates to the countries being uncorrelated with origin country labor supply.  
Further, origin country balance of payments crises and natural disasters are associated 
with lower migration to Canada, the UK, and Spain.  The one origin country shock that is 
associated with higher migration to these countries is civil and military unrest, which may 
facilitate applications for asylum.  The results suggest that given the preference of 
Canada and the UK for skilled workers and asylum seekers, shocks whose only effect is 
to put downward pressure on origin country wages do little to increase Latin American 
migration to these destinations.  Indeed, given that negative wage shocks may make it 
harder for individuals in Latin America to acquire skills (as would be the case if the 
financing of education is budget constrained), it is not surprising that they tend to reduce 
migration to countries that favor skilled workers.  
  In section 2, we present a simple dynamic model of migration from a given origin 
country to multiple destinations.  In section 3, we describe data on labor supply, 
migration rates, economic and political shocks, and other variables.  In section 4, we 
present the empirical results.  And in section 5, we offer concluding remarks.  
 
2 THEORY 
  To understand emigration from Latin America, we construct a model of national 
labor markets that are linked by migration.  In each economy, there is one sector of 
production.  Workers from Latin America are differentiated by age but are not otherwise   6 
distinguished by their skill.
8
  In the origin country, the national wage for age group i at time t is given by, 
  We allow for costs in labor mobility, following models of 
internal migration in Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Borjas (2006). 
(1)    () η = it it it W XL , 
where Wit is the wage, Xit is a labor-demand shifter, Lit is the population of working-age 
adults in the country, and η ≤ 0 is the inverse labor-demand elasticity.  The supply of 
labor in the origin country is the population of group i that has not emigrated, such that  
(2)    0 = − it i it LLM  
where Li0 is the pre-emigration population of group i and Mit is the number of individuals 
in i that have left the country by period t.  Putting (1) and (2) together, 
(3)    0 ln ln ln = +η −η it it i it W X Lm , 
where mit=Mit/Li0 is the fraction of group i that has moved abroad.
9
  An individual in the origin country has the option of staying at home or moving to 
one of two possible destinations, country A or country B.  In the year birth cohort i first 
enters the labor market, the wage in country c is given by, 
  In equation (1), we 
treat wages as though they are a function of labor supply in a single age cohort.  In the 
empirical estimation, we also account for the size of neighboring age cohorts. 
(4)    0 00 ()
c cc
i ii W XL η = , 
where X
c
i0 is a labor-demand shifter, L
c
i0 is initial labor supply, and η is the inverse labor-
demand elasticity.  In later periods, we assume the wage in country c is determined by 
initial labor supply and subsequent innovations to labor demand, imposing the restriction 
                                                 
8 We ignore other aspects of skill because in order to measure net migration by age in Latin America we 
need to track populations by characteristics which are invariant to time. 
9 In (3), we utilize the approximation that, for small values of X/Y, ln(X+Y) ≈ lnX + Y/X.   7 
that the impact of immigration on the destination country’s wage is negligible.  It is 
straightforward to extend the model to allow for adjustment in destination-country wages; 
we suppress such adjustment solely to simplify the exposition.
10
  To allow for costs in the mobility of labor between countries, we assume that 
migration from the origin country to destination-country c in any period t is an increasing 
function of the lagged difference in wages between the two countries: 
 
(5)    ( ) ,1 ,1 ln ln
cc c c
i t it it v W WF −− = σ −− , 
where  0 /
cc
it it i v ML = ∆ is the net emigration rate to country c for group i at t, σ
c ∈ [0,1] is 
the supply elasticity (specific to the destination country), and F
c is a wage discount that 
origin country nationals associate with living in country c.  As long as σ
c is sufficiently 
small, it will take multiple periods before migration succeeds in raising the origin country 
wage to destination country levels.
11
  To solve the model, define the pre-migration effective wage differential between 
the origin country and destination c as, 
  In the empirical analysis, we will allow the 
magnitude of the labor supply elasticity, σ
c, to depend on origin and destination country 
characteristics, including distance and number of countries crossed, as a means of 
capturing how immigration policy in or migration costs to the destination may affect the 
responsiveness of bilateral migration to labor market shocks. 
(6)    0 0 0 00 ln ln ln ln
c c c c cc
i i i ii W WF xF ω= − − = η + −  . 
where  0 00 ln ln ln
cc
i ii LL = −  is initial log relative labor supply and  0 00 ln ln ln
cc
i ii xXX = − is 
                                                 
10 Allowing for destination-country wage adjustment changes the magnitude of the reduced-form 
parameters in the emigration equation but does not change their sign.  See Hanson and McIntosh (2010). 
11 For a zero migration disamenity, the condition that migration does not cause wage equalization in one 
period is that,  ( ) 1 0 00 0 ln ln ln ln ln 0 1
cc c c
i i ii i WW WW W = −ησ − < ⇔ < +ησ , which we assume holds.    8 
initial log relative labor demand.  The pre-migration wage difference is increasing in the 
origin country’s relative labor supply (since η < 0) and decreasing in the origin country’s 
relative labor demand.
12
(7)    
  Using (3), (5), and (6), we solve for the t = 0 emigration rate, 
and then iterate forward, solving for the wage and emigration rate in each period.  In an 
appendix, we show that after dropping higher order terms (i.e., those that involve a 
minimum of four-way interactions between the model parameters, all of which are 
individually less than one in value) and using the approximation that (1+x)
t ≈ 1+tx, the 
net migration rate from the origin country to country A at time t can be written as, 
( ) ( ) 00 11 1
A AA A ABB
it i i v tt  = σω + η σ − + η σσω −  . 
Plugging in the determinants of the initial wage differential in (6), we obtain, 
(8)     𝜈𝑖𝑡
𝐴 = 𝑙𝑛ℓ𝑖0
𝐴 [𝜃𝐴 + (𝜃𝐴)2(𝑡 − 1)] + [𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖0
𝐴 − 𝐹𝐴][𝜎𝐴 + 𝜎𝐴𝜃𝐴(𝑡 − 1)]  
  
                                  +𝑙𝑛ℓ𝑖0
𝐵 𝜃𝐵𝜃𝐴(𝑡 − 1) + [𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖0
𝐵 − 𝐹𝐵]𝜎𝐵𝜃𝐴(𝑡 − 1) 
 
where  0
cc θ = ησ < .  Equation (8) shows the key predictions of the theoretical 
framework:  emigration to country A is decreasing (increasing) in the relative size of 
country A’s initial labor supply (demand) and increasing (decreasing) in the initial 
relative labor supply (demand) of country B, where the effects of initial conditions 
diminish as a cohort ages, owing to adjustment in wages in the origin country.  Since the 
dynamic wage adjustment terms (i.e., those that involve t) depend on the square of labor 
supply and labor demand elasticities, their effect on attenuating the impact of initial labor 
market conditions may be small (which empirical results will confirm).  Similarly, since 
the effect of labor market conditions in country B on migration to country A depends on 
                                                 




i0.  It is easy to 
generalize the model to allow for time-varying labor demand shocks, as in Hanson and McIntosh (2010)     9 
the three-way product of labor demand and supply elasticities, it may also be small 
(which empirical results will also confirm). 
  It is apparent in equation (8) that to examine the evolution of migration for a 
given birth cohort we need to be able to track cohorts over time, preventing us from 
accounting for time varying characteristics of individuals, such as education.  Also 
apparent is that equation (8) is missing the effects of past innovations to labor demand in 
the source and destination countries on current migration flows.  Allowing innovations to 
labor demand to affect wages introduces into (8) a series of distributed lag terms in these 
innovations (see note 12).  In the estimation, we allow for such effects by including 
measures of labor market shocks that occurred between the time a cohort comes of 
working age and the current period.   
Equation (8) is the basis for the empirical estimation.  For individual birth cohorts 
in Latin American and Caribbean origin countries, we examine the correlation between 
the decadal migration rate to a specific destination country and initial relative labor 
supply, initial relative labor demand, and subsequent innovations to labor demand.  
Consistent with theory, we allow the responsiveness of migration to labor-market shocks 
to vary across destination countries.  By pooling data across cohorts, origins, destinations, 
and time, we are able to include a rich set of fixed effects in the estimation to control for 
unobserved shocks to migration.  The fixed effects also help absorb variation in migration 
disamenities and migration policy across countries. 
 
3 DATA 
  The data we require for the estimation include measures of migration rates for 
pairs of origin and destination countries, labor supply by birth cohort and country, and   10 
measures of economic shocks for origin and destination countries. 
 
3.1 Bilateral migration rates 
To calculate bilateral migration rates we use the number of immigrants by age and 
origin country in each destination county’s census count, and the size of the relevant birth 
cohorts in the origin country, as measured by the World Development Indicators.  The 
bilateral net migration rate for a given birth cohort and origin-destination pair is then the 
change in the stock of immigrants in that cohort from a particular origin country in a 
particular destination, divided by the size of the original birth cohort in the origin.  In all 
regressions, the dependent variable is the annualized bilateral net migration rate for a 
birth cohort over the relevant time period (in most cases the ten years between censuses). 
For the US, we are able to measure age -specific stocks of immigrants from all but 
the very smallest Latin American and Caribbean countries in 1980, 1990, 2000, and 
2005, using data from decennial censuses and the American Communities Survey 
(2005).
13
Data for the UK and Spain are more problematic.  For the UK, we have country 
specific immigration stocks aggregated by five year birth cohorts in 1981, 1991, and 
2001, based on data provided by the UK Census Commission.  For Spain, we have 
similar data for 1981, 2001, and 2007 (the 1991 census reports region rather than country 
of birth for many countries in the sample).  The aggregation of immigration stocks into 
five year birth cohorts for the UK and Spain means we have fewer observations on cohort 
specific migration rates for these countries.  A further problem is that the UK provides 
  For Canada, we have similar measures from decennial censuses for 1981, 
1991, and 2001, provided by Statistics Canada.   
                                                 
13 We can measure immigrant stocks for the US in earlier years as well, but this is of no use since our data 
on births do not begin until 1960 (meaning we cannot measure source-country labor supply before 1976).   11 
incomplete data on immigration stocks for non-Commonwealth countries in the region, as 
does Spain for countries that are not former colonies.  Consequently, UK and Spanish 
data are a mix of stocks for individual origin countries and aggregates of remaining 
countries in the region.  In both cases, the residual aggregates are very small in size, 
indicating that few individuals from former Spanish colonies migrate to the UK or vice 
versa.  Because of the limited scope of the UK and Spanish data, we begin the analysis 
using data for the US and Canada, for which we have nearly complete data on origin 
countries, and then expand the sample to include the two other destinations.  The 
appendix shows the number of usable cohort-specific bilateral net migration rates we 
have for each origin and destination country pair. 
  To gauge the magnitude of emigration from Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Table 2 reports total emigration rates in 2000 by origin country, as well as the fraction of 
emigrants residing in the US, Canada, Spain, and the UK, using data from Parsons at al. 
(2007).  Excluded are Cuba, which severely restricts emigration, and countries with fewer 
than 200,000 inhabitants in 2000, all of which are Caribbean islands (on which we have 
incomplete data).  Evident in Table 2 is variation in the attractiveness of the four 
principal destinations to emigrants from the region.  In the Caribbean and Central 
America, the share of emigrants going to the four destinations is above 50 percent in all 
countries, except Nicaragua,
14
In the more remote South American region, the share of emigrants going to the 
four destinations exceeds 50 percent for only two countries, Ecuador and Guyana.  For 
Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, neighboring Argentina is an important 
 and above 70 percent in all other countries except Haiti, a 
former French colony, and Antigua and Barbuda.    
                                                 
14 In 2000, 43% of Nicaragua’s emigrants resided in neighboring Costa Rica.   12 
destination; the share of emigrants going to the four destinations plus Argentina is above 
60 percent for each country.  For Colombia, neighboring Venezuela is an important 
destination; the share of its emigrants going to the four destinations plus Venezuela is 
81.3%.  Thus, in South America nearby rich nations appear to compete for migrants with 
more distant high-income countries.  In Table 2 we also see that Argentina and Brazil – 
South America’s largest nations – have low emigration rates, in either case less than 2 
percent.  Of the countries in Table 2, we exclude from the analysis Argentina, which in 
the sample period is more a destination for migration than an origin, and Brazil, which as 
a former Portuguese colony sends few migrants to the US, Canada, the UK, or Spain. 
In the empirical analysis, we focus on migration rates for individuals aged 16 to 
40, as these are peak years for migration (Hanson and McIntosh, 2010).  Also, since our 
birth cohort data from the World Development Indicators do not begin until 1960, we are 
unable to measure migration for cohorts older than 40 years of age.  To gauge the 
variation in migration rates for the sample cohorts, Table 3 shows the average migration 
rate across cohorts by origin and destination country pair in the latest available year.  
Emigration rates for small countries are quite high, with over 10 percent of the sample 
cohorts of Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, and Guyana – 
each with fewer than 1 million inhabitants – having migrated to the US alone.  Migration 
rates into Canada and the UK are highest for former British colonies:  Antigua and 
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Granada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.  
For Spain, migration rates vary considerably across its former colonies, with the highest 
rates found in South America, which is relatively distant from the US.  Ecuadoran 
migration to Spain is a curious outlier, with 17.8% of cohorts having migrated as of 2007.   13 
Table 4 provides perspective on the sample variation we will be exploiting in the 
estimation, where the dependent variable is the annualized net migration rate calculated 
over the interval between the previous and current destination census.  The table gives the 
net migration rates during the latest available interval.  Apparent are sharp differences in 
net migration rates across origin countries for given destinations and across destinations 
for given origins.  While migration rates to the US from Grenada, Honduras, Guyana, 
Mexico, and El Salvador are high, they are practically zero for Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Nicaragua, and Paraguay, and the 2000-2005 period actually saw reverse net migration to 
Antigua and Belize.  For the countries with high migration to the US, only Grenada and 
Guyana show high net migration rates to Canada.  Similarly, among the countries 
showing little net migration to the US, Bolivia, Colombia and Paraguay exhibit sharp 
increases in migration to Spain.  We turn next to facts that might account for this cross-
sectional variation in changes in migration rates.    
 
3.2  Labor supply in sending and receiving countries 
The first labor market shock we consider are changes in labor supply, associated 
with earlier differences in birth rates across countries.  We measure labor supply using 
the number of live births in each country, as reported in World Development Indicators, 
which begin in 1960.  Assuming that individuals enter the labor force at age 16, the 
number of individuals born, say, in El Salvador in 1970 would indicate the number of 
individuals coming of working age in 1986.  By taking the ratio of origin country and 
birth country labor supply, we can take advantage of the cross-destination country 
heterogeneity in this dyadic data structure.   
In using number of births to measure labor supply, we ignore variation across   14 
source countries in both mortality rates and labor force participation rates, data on which 
we cannot obtain by age and year.  While cross-country variation in mortality rates is a 
concern, there are two reasons why it is unlikely to be a significant problem for our 
analysis.  One is that we focus on migration of those of prime migration age, which is 16 
to 40.  For individuals out of childhood but not yet in middle age, variation in mortality 
across Latin American countries is relatively low.  More importantly, much of the 
variation in mortality rates is absorbed by the country and time dummies that we include 
in the estimation.  In a regression of annual mortality rates for nations in Latin America 
and the Caribbean on country dummies and year dummies, the adjusted R squared is 0.94 
for infant mortality, 0.95 for under-5 mortality, and 0.86 for adult mortality.  Thus, most 
of the cross-country variation in mortality can be removed by removing country-specific 
means and time-specific means from the data, which we do in the empirical analysis. 
  Figure 1 shows the time series of births for countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean from 1960 to 2005.  Immediately apparent is strong variation in the time 
pattern of births across countries.  In the Andes, births grow steadily between 1960 and 
1980 in all countries except Colombia and then flatten out.  In Central America, births 
grow steadily through the mid 1970s in all countries except Costa Rica and then flatten 
differentially, slowing first in El Salvador, followed by Nicaragua and Honduras and 
never slowing in Guatemala.  By the 1960s, the Southern Cone had already entered an era 
of slow population growth and births are flat across time in all countries except Paraguay.  
The Caribbean contains a mix of outcomes, with some countries showing growth in births 
(Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti), and others showing declines (Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago).  Variation in the growth of births across countries   15 
produces variation in the growth of labor supply 15 to 20 years hence.  It is this variation 
in birth levels we will exploit to identify the impact of labor supply on emigration. 
  An important question is whether the factors that produce variation in fertility 
across countries are correlated with emigration, potentially confounding our empirical 
analysis.  The literature associates national differences in levels and changes in fertility 
with a large set of determinants (see, e.g., Dasgupta, 1995; Galor, 2005; Lehr, 2009).  
Because realizations on emigration are observed between 16 and 40 years after the shifts 
which caused the changes in birth cohort size, we take these changes to be pre-
determined for our analysis.  We assume that, given country, year, and cohort fixed 
effects, the most plausible explanation for correlation between country-level birth cohort 
size and subsequent migration is the cohort size itself.  Of course, the size of birth cohorts 
may summarize more about a country than its labor supply.  In section 4, we discuss 
alternative interpretations of our results. 
   
3.3 Labor demand shocks in sending and receiving countries  
To control for how changes in labor demand affect migration, we include in the 
estimation of equation (8) per capita GDP in the year a cohort entered the labor market, 
as well as contemporaneous per capita GDP, for both the origin and destination country.  
As we control for origin and destination country fixed effects in the regressions, per 
capita GDP effectively picks up how differential income values in a given year affect 
migration.  As it turns out, entry year and contemporaneous per capita GDP tend to be 
highly correlated, such that we sometimes include just one of these variables.   
Average income is an obvious control, but by no means the only factor that 
affects migrant perceptions of living standards at home or abroad.  Over the time period   16 
we study, which spans the mid 1970s to the mid 2000s, Latin America experienced 
multiple balance of payments crises, frequent natural disasters, and episodes of intense 
civil unrest.  Such events disrupt the lives of individuals, reducing their income and 
wealth and often displacing them from their homes.  While these shocks are temporary, 
they are often severe in nature, sufficient to lead to temporary or permanent emigration.  
We construct measures of the incidence of these shocks equal to the number of events 
that occur in a country over a given time period divided by the number of years in the 
period, which we refer to as the annualized shock incidence. 
  To capture balance of payments crises, which are typically followed by a banking 
crises and collapse in GDP, we use the measures of sudden stops in Cavallo (2007), 
which indicates whether a country has a large decline in its current account, with foreign 
capital inflows suddenly reversing and becoming capital outflows.  Calvo (1998) 
associates such episodes with a loss in investor confidence in a country, as occurs when 
investors downgrade expectations about a country’s capacity to service its debts or 
maintain a pegged exchange rate.  Cavallo’s definition of a sudden stop is whether a 
country experiences a decline of greater than two standard deviations in a current account 
surplus in successive years, where he measures the standard deviation four different 
ways.  We take the average incidence across the four measures between census intervals.  
Table 5 reports the incidence of sudden stops over the sample period.  Mexico, Colombia, 
and Ecuador are the countries most prone to capital inflow reversals, with 11 other 
economies experiencing at least one sudden stop in recent years.  Nine countries 
experience no sudden stops, with seven of these being Caribbean nations. 
  Natural disasters are a common occurrence in Latin America, given its proximity   17 
to the Ring of Fire and exposure to tropical storms in both the Caribbean and Pacific.  
Following Yang (2008), we define a serious natural disaster as an earthquake over 7.5 on 
the Richter scale, a windstorm (e.g., hurricane) lasting a week or more, or a landslide or 
volcanic eruption that affects more than 1000 people.  We count the number of events 
that occur between census intervals.  Data on these events are from the International 
Emergency Event Database (http://www.emdat.be/).  Mexico, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and 
Honduras  have the highest incidence of natural disasters, with only seven countries 
escaping a serious disaster during the sample period. 
  The last three decades have been a time of political transition in Latin America, 
with military coups displacing democratically elected governments during the 1960s and 
1970s, followed by a return to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s.  Armed insurgencies 
have occurred in over a half dozen countries, with these conflicts involving thousands of 
casualties and lasting for a decade or more.  We measure conflict as the number of years 
between census intervals in which a serious conflict exists (be it extra-state, intra-state, 
internal, or internationalized internal in nature) that resulted in the deaths of over 1000 
people.  The source is the CSCW Monadic Armed Conflict Database from the 
International Peace Research Institute (http://www.prio.no/).  Colombia, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua are the most conflict prone countries, with each country being 
subject to a conflict of some type in one quarter or more of the sample years. 
 
3.4  Immigration policy in receiving countries 
  The four main receiving countries for Latin American emigration differ 
considerably in their immigration policies.  The US, which is the most important 
destination for Latin American emigrants, manages immigration through granting   18 
permanent residence visas and temporary work visas, and enforcing the US territory 
against illegal immigration.  The 2,000 mile long US border with Mexico makes illegal 
entry an attractive option for migrants from Latin America.  In 2005, the last year of our 
US sample, there were 18.9 million immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean 
residing in the US (Camarota, 2005), of whom 46.2% were estimated to be in the country 
illegally (Passel, 2006).  The majority of legal immigrants from Latin America enter as 
family members of US citizens and residents.  In 2005, family sponsored visas accounted 
for 76.6% of US legal inflows from the region, with employer sponsored visas (the 
majority of whom are skill workers) accounting for 13.6% and refugees and asylees 
accounting for 1.9% (DHS, 2005).
15
  Canada has long managed its immigration policy through a regime that favors 
skilled workers, the legal basis for which was established in 1976 and modified several 
times since (Mayda and Patel, 2004).  Individuals earn points for entry depending on their 
youth, education, work experience, ability to speak English or French, and having a job 
offer from a Canadian employer.  In 2001, the last year in our Canadian sample, skilled 
immigrants accounted for 60.6% of permanent immigration visas, family members of 
Canadians 26.6%, and refugees and asylees 11.3% (OECD, 2004).  Because of the 
emphasis on skills, Latin America, where education levels remain relatively low, 
accounts for a small share of Canadian immigration, comprising 8.0% of legal inflows in 
2001.  If an individual from Latin America cannot quality for a Canadian visa on the 
basis of skills or family, the primary means of entry would be through asylum.  
  While the US is relatively open to inflows of low 
skilled labor from Latin America, few individuals in the region qualify as skilled workers 
and fewer still (outside of Cuba) as refugees or asylees. 
                                                 
15 These figures exclude Cuba, for which 90.0% of immigrants are refugees or asylees.   19 
  The UK belongs to the European Union and allows for the unrestricted movement 
of EU citizens.  Outside of the EU, immigration is limited to family members of UK 
citizens, skilled workers, temporary workers with a job offer from a UK employer, 
citizens of Commonwealth countries with UK ancestry, and refugees and asylees.  
Commonwealth citizens aged 17 to 30 who lack UK ancestry may qualify for a “working 
holiday” in which they spend two years in the UK, with eligibility to work for one of 
these.
16
  Spain’s immigration policy is somewhat difficult to specify.  As an EU member, 
it allows the unrestricted movement of EU citizens.  Until the late 1980s, the country was 
primarily a source of emigration.  Following the sudden increase in immigration inflows 
in the 1990s, government policy responded slowly, being concerned initially with how to 
treat those who had already found a way into the country.  It appears that a large fraction 
of non-EU immigrants who entered Spain in the 1990s and 2000s did so illegally or as 
visitors (Dolado and Velasquez, 2007).  For those able to obtain employment, the 
government has been relatively permissive in granting legal work permits, offering 
multiple amnesties to undocumented workers in the last two decades.  The most 
  Some individuals may abuse such visas by staying on in the country and 
working illegally.  In 2001, the last year of our UK sample, asylum seekers accounted for 
24.5% of immigration admissions, temporary foreign workers 22.8%, and EU citizens 
16.2%, with the remainder made up by family members of UK citizens and skilled 
workers (OECD, 2004).  In 2002, which is after our sample period, the UK implemented 
a point system intended to expand skilled immigration (Mayda and Patel, 2004).  For 
Latin America, opportunities to migrate to the UK would appear to be limited primarily 
to Commonwealth citizens and refugees and asylum seekers. 
                                                 
16 See http://www.ukvisas.gov.uk.   20 
significant barrier to migrants from Latin America entering Spain may not be obtaining a 
visa but the cost associated with travel, establishing residence, and finding initial 
employment as an undocumented worker.  Recently, Spain has expanded the number of 
work visas it supplies in an attempt to direct immigration through legal channels, 
requiring prospective migrants to line up a job before entering the country. 
  Immigration policy mediates how labor demand and supply shocks affect 
migration rates between origin and destination countries.  In the absence of barriers to 
immigration, the only barrier to moving between countries is the travel expense of 
relocating from one place to another, which is likely to be positively related to the 
distance between locations.  Where illegal immigration is an option, distance is likely to 
have an even more pronounced role.  For individuals in Mexico, migrating illegally to the 
United States is a matter of crossing the US-Mexico border.  For individuals in 
Guatemala, illegal migration is more difficult as they must successfully pass through 
Mexico before negotiating the US border.  And for individuals from countries further to 
the south, illegal migration is likely to be more problematic still.  Given the complication 
of crossing multiple borders, it is perhaps not surprising that Mexico accounts for 56% of 
illegal immigrants in the US, Central America 15%, and South America only 7% (Passel, 
2006).  Where legal immigration regulated by binding quotas is the only option, as in 
Canada and the UK, distance may be a much less important factor.  There is likely to be 
greater weight on whether individuals have family members in the destination, ancestral 
ties to the destination, sufficient skills, or claims on asylum. 
  To consider the interaction between distance and immigration policy, Figure 2 
shows how net migration rates to destinations change with distance from the origin   21 
country, where we plot this relationship for each destination separately.  For the US, in 
which nearly half of Latin American immigration is illegal, migration rates decline 
strongly with distance.  Moving further away from the US appears to complicate 
migrating to the country.  For Canada, in which skill based immigration and asylum are 
the primary options for most Latin Americans, migration rates change little with distance 
from the origin.  The relationship for Spain is similarly flat.  Only for the UK do we also 
see a negative association between migration rates and distance, where this relationship 
may be attributable to British former colonies being concentrated in the Caribbean, which 
is located relatively close to Europe.  The variation in the distance-migration relationship 
is initial evidence of how immigration policy may mediate the underlying drivers of 
migration.  In the next section, we examine a range of shocks more formally.   
 
4   RESULTS 
4.1.  Partitioned Analysis 
  Table 6 provides a first comparative overview of the results by estimating the 
migration effects of labor supply and demand shocks separately for each destination.   
The dependent variable in all specifications is the annualized net migration rate for a 
given birth cohort and origin-destination pair (the change in the stock of immigrants in 
that cohort from a particular origin country in a particular destination, divided by the size 
of the original birth cohort in the origin).  The first two columns present impacts in the 
US and Canada using annual birth cohorts (meaning we measure migration rates in each 
birth year separately).   Data from Spain and the UK come aggregated into 5-year birth 
cohorts, and when we perform pooled analysis we will aggregate the US and Canada in a 
similar way.  Table 6 presents partitioned results under both aggregation schemes.     22 
The analysis features variables that enter at the origin country level, the origin 
birth cohort level, the destination birth cohort level, and interactions with destination 
country dummies.   The data therefore have a non-nested multi-level structure, and it is 
not perfectly clear how we should handle our standard errors.  The number of clusters is 
relatively small across most of the primary dimensions (26 birth countries, 4 destinations, 
10 destination census waves, and 12 aggregated birth cohorts), and so our ability to 
estimate consistent cluster level covariance terms is limited.
17   As a conservative way of 
estimating standard errors that nonetheless provides a sufficient number of observations 
for consistent estimation, we cluster our analysis at the dyad level (origin * destination), 
for 73 dyads in an aggregated dataset of 832 usable observations.
18
For the US, we find a strong impact of a demographic push created by large origin 
birth cohorts.    The log birth cohort size ratio (birth cohort size in origin/birth cohort size 
in destination) enters positively and highly significantly.  Emigration to the US is 
increasing and strongly concave in age, with the peak migration age being 28.  There is 
evidence of a complex relationship between initial income of a cohort, which increases 
migration to the US, and current income, which weakly retards it.  Canada displays 
patterns that are similar but considerably muted in absolute terms; the marginal effect of a 
given labor supply shock is one twenty-fifth as large for migration to Canada, and 
insignificant. While migration to the US is increasing and concave in age, it is interesting 
to note that Canadian immigration generates migration rates that are weakly increasing 
  In the segregated 
data structure of Table 6 this is equivalent to clustering by origin country. 
                                                 
17 Cluster asymptotics are based on the number of clusters and not the number of observations per cluster 
(Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2008). 
18 We have experimented with different clustering structures, and all results discussed here are robust to the 
alternative strategy of clustering by origin country.   23 
and convex in age, perhaps reflecting the bias of the country’s point system in favor of 
individuals who have completed their education and are therefore older.   
  Columns 3-6 of Table 6 present results using birth cohorts aggregated at the five-
year level, as is found in the raw data from Spain and the UK.  We collapse the North 
American origins to match the age aggregation used in the UK census, and then define all 
dummies effectively shifting the Spanish birth structure off by one year so that there is 
full agreement between the census years, ages, and birth years in the aggregated cohorts 
across all four destinations.
19
  Figure 2 suggests a sharply different role of geographic distance for the US and 
Canada.  The basic role of the US in buffering Canada from overland migration implies 
that the issue of contiguity of migration origins may also play less of a role.  To 
investigate this possibility, Table 7 interacts measures of proximity with labor supply 
shocks to see whether they modulate the migration impact of demographic push factors.  
As described in Section 3.1, the data from the US and Canada provide a more 
   This aggregation makes little difference in the answers for 
the impact of labor supply shocks on migration into Canada and the US; point estimates 
and t-statistics are both very similar.  We have little explanatory power in the partitioned 
regressions over migration to Spain or the UK, although if anything the effect of labor 
supply shocks appears to have an opposite sign in the UK as it does in the US.  That the 
results for the US are similar for one- and five-year birth cohorts suggests that the size of 
neighboring cohorts, first discussed in Section 2, carries little weight in identifying how 
initial labor supply affects later migration.  We return to neighboring cohorts below. 
                                                 
19 This is done to assure comparability when we move to pooled analysis.   While the weighting of the 
regressions by the size of the cohort takes care of any mechanical objections over correct sample inference, 
there may additional problems arising from the error in the estimates differing, or the smoothing in the 
impact that arises from aggregation of birth cohorts.   We therefore transform the structure of the US and 
Canadian data to match that of the other countries.   24 
comprehensive view of migration across origins.  While all four destinations record a 
complete set of origins in their final census, only the North American countries have 
done so consistently over time.
20
  The first four columns of Table 7 present results for the US and Canada 
separately, taking advantage of the large set of origins available for these two countries.  
For the US, the impact of labor supply shocks is lower for island nations, weakly lower 
with great circle distance, and much smaller for non-island countries based on the number 
of other countries that must be crossed to reach the US by land.  Hence, proximity plays a 
role in determining the impact of variation in labor supply, particularly for origins where 
migrants make an overland trip to reach the US.  For Canada, in contrast, birth cohort 
sizes are insignificant overall as well as having no differential slope across any of our 
measures of proximity.
    Data from the US and Canada allow us to test for 
marginal effects across the whole distribution of origins and not just those with strong 
links to the destination.   We therefore focus first on an analysis of heterogeneity in the 
response to labor market conditions, using data from these two countries alone. 
21
                                                 
20 The most obvious form of attrition bias caused by the UK and Spain recording only high-migration 
origins in early years is that by definition a dyad with zero observed migration has demonstrated no 
sensitivity to the shocks measured here.  This would suggest that the UK and Spain would have marginal 
effects that are biased upwards by attrition.    Our results show precisely the opposite, namely that the US 
(which records the most complete set of origins) is much more sensitive to a wide variety of shocks, and 
hence we conclude that if anything this attrition problem is causing us to underestimate the true degree of 
‘American exceptionalism’.  
  Note that the uninteracted coefficients on labor supply shocks 
are of real interest here as they represent the projected impact of a labor supply in an 
idealized origin that is ‘on top of’ the destination, with no distance between them and no 
countries to cross.  Even in such an idealized case, immigration to Canada does not 
respond to birth cohort size. 
21 Note that with only a single destination, we cannot include raw distance in combination with origin fixed 
effects, and so the uninteracted impact of distance is omitted in columns 1-4.  Countries crossed is not 
defined for Spain and the UK, and so we do not include this variable in the pooled regressions.   25 
Columns 5-8 of Table 7 pool together all destinations, a data structure that forces 
us to consider the substantial heterogeneity present across destinations in the sample.  
The US population is ten times that of Canada, and hence even with comparable 
proportional migration the flow of migration measured relative to the size of origin-
country birth cohorts will differ by an order of magnitude.  Furthermore, as seen in Table 
3, migration to the US as a fraction of origin population is substantially higher than it is 
to the other destinations. In order to prevent this cross-sectional heterogeneity in birth-
cohort ratios and migration rates from informing coefficients, we always include 
destination-country fixed effects when multiple destinations are pooled together. 
  The pooled analysis confirms the uniqueness of the US as a destination.  Column 
5 of Table 7 shows that birth cohort size is a stronger driver of migration to the US than 
to the other destinations, and column 6 shows that proximity to the US is more important 
as well.  Column 7 combines these two effects and shows that the rate at which the 
sensitivity to labor supply shocks falls off with distance is again greatest for migration to 
the US.   In column 8 we again confirm the unique sensitivity to labor supply of nearby 
origins with overland migration routes to the US, but also find that for the (Caribbean) 
island origins where overall migration to the US is lower, sensitivity to birth cohort size 
is also lower.  This poses an interesting geographic divide, suggesting that population 
growth in Mexico and Central America primarily pushes migrants to the US, while 
growth in labor supply in the Caribbean, equally close to the US but tied to the UK and 
Canada through historical bonds, pushes migrants to those destinations instead. 
 
4.2.  Shocks 
  We next consider how a broader set of shocks may drive migration, and may   26 
modulate the effect of labor supply shocks themselves.  Our data provide an intuitive way 
to examine the impact of shocks on migration because we have long time series over 
many countries, and so observe a sufficiently large number of shocks in the data to 
estimate precise impacts.  The three shocks we consider in Table 8 are: 
•  Number of Serious Natural Disasters is the annualized count, over census intervals, 
of earthquakes over 7.5 Richter, windstorms lasting a week or more, or landslides or 
volcano eruptions affecting more than 1000 people in origin country.  In order to 
remove heterogeneity introduced by the raw size of the country, we divide the 
number of shocks by land area (thousand square kilometers). 
 
•  Number of Sudden Stops is the annualized count, over census intervals, of Sudden 
Stops 1-4 from Cavallo (2007), defined as a year-on-year fall in the current account 
surplus of at least 2 standard deviation from the sample mean, with standard 
deviations calculated four alternative ways. 
 
•  Civil Conflict is from CSCW Monadic Armed Conflict data, calculated as a the 
number of years between census intervals in which conflict exists in the origin 
country in which more than 1000 people died. 
 
Table 8 takes the pooled data structure to the analysis of origin-country shocks in driving 
emigration from the Americas.  The table can be read by taking the ‘Shock’ referred to in 
the third row from the column title, so the first two columns examine the effect of and 
interactions with natural disasters, and so on.   
 Negative shocks that are not political in nature will likely increase the desire for 
emigration from origin countries, but will not alter the access to legal immigration in 
asylum-driven destinations.  Civil conflict, on the other hand, both increases the ‘push’ 
factor behind emigration and creates the ability to apply for asylum.  Correspondingly, in 
Table 8 we find that non-political shocks (weakly) increase migration to the US (columns 
1 and 3), while political shocks increase migration to all other destinations (column 5).  
The uninteracted coefficient on civil conflict is 0.25, indicating that average migration 
rates to all three other destinations will go up by 2.5% over ten years, or an additional   27 
7.5% of the birth cohort emigrated to all three destinations over the 10 years around the 
conflict.  Even here the US is distinct; in the case of civil conflict migration rates to the 
US are significantly lower, both relative to the other destinations and in absolute terms.   
The even-numbered columns in Table 8 intersect the two families of shocks by 
examining whether the responsiveness of migration to labor supply and income shocks is 
larger when these coincide with shocks of other types.  In other words, perhaps an 
individual in a large, low-wage cohort would have stayed put had economic times been 
good, but in the face of a downturn will choose to migrate. Large cohorts that also face 
non-political shocks are far more likely to migrate to the US (columns 2 and 4), and large 
cohort facing political shocks are far more likely to migrate to the other destinations 
(column 6).  Labor supply does interact with other shocks in powerful ways.  The 
heterogeneous response of migration to origin-country shocks across destinations is most 
pronounced when labor supply pressures are increasing the incentives to migrate.   
  Columns 3 and 4 of Table 8 present a nuanced picture of the ways in which 
income and national economic shocks interact to drive migration to the US, because they 
allow us to separately identify the impact of the overall initial wealth of a cohort (GDP pc 
at age 16) independently from a sudden macroeconomic shock (sudden stops).   We see 
that when a cohort does experience an economic shock, the higher is income at the time 
when the shock occurs, the greater is the impact of the shock on migration to the US.  
Combined with the results in the second row of Table 6, this suggests that on the whole 
income is a sharper determinant of the ability to undertake the economically costly move 
to the US, but that underlying there is a stronger tendency for a downturn in a migrant’s 
economic prospects in the origin country to trigger migration to the US.    28 
Column 6 of Table 8 continues to provide evidence of the uniqueness of political 
shocks across the destinations. While labor supply plays a relatively larger role in driving 
migration to the US under all the other shocks, here we see it playing a much weaker role 
when there is a civil conflict.  That is to say, once a political shock has opened up the 
asylum conduit for migration to Canada, Spain, and the UK, birth cohort sizes become 
more influential, again in both absolute and relative terms.  
 
4.3  Network Effects 
A different cut on Table 8 is that where shocks deliver a comparatively large 
direct effect on the number of migrants going to a destination, further migration to that 
destination becomes more sensitive to birth cohort size.  One interpretation of this result 
is that network effects begin to lower the costs of further migration once it has begun, and 
so the constant pressure that birth cohort sizes exert on the incentive to migrate becomes 
more visible.  We now proceed to examine these network effects more directly. 
  A standard way to investigate heterogeneity that arises from network effects is to 
use the historical stock of migrants as a proxy for the strength of networks (see the survey 
in Hanson, 2010).  The analogy in our data is to use the earliest census year in which we 
have an observation on migration between an origin and a destination, and calculate the 
dyadic stock of migrants across cohorts in that year.  This is then the first available 
observation on the number of people from each origin living in each destination.    
Column 1 of Table 9 gives a base specification for comparison purposes.  Column 
2 illustrates the strong overall effect of initial migrant stocks on subsequent migration 
rates across the sample. Column 3 shows that the full-sample sensitivity to labor supply 
shocks is not significantly higher when a large base stock of migrant exists, although the   29 
interaction between labor supply shocks and initial migrant stock is positive and is 
significant at the 90% level.  The final column tests whether the raw effect of base 
migrant stocks is stronger in the US; the results indicate that these stocks matter about 
twice as much in the US as elsewhere.
22
 
   Our results thus demonstrate a role of network 
effects that is strong overall and substantially stronger in the US.  While variables that 
proxy for the strength of network effects explain migration overall, they are particularly 
critical in determining the predominantly economically-driven migration to the US.   
4.4.  Extensions and Robustness Checks 
   A first concern that may arise when considering these results relates to the use of 
relatively fine-grained birth cohorts (even our most aggregated analysis uses five-year 
cohorts).  While the comparison of aggregated (five-year birth cohorts) and disaggregated 
(one-year birth cohorts) results in Table 6 does not incline us to think that this 
aggregation will be the source of major measurement problems, a question remains as to 
the relationships between adjacent cohorts.  To the extent that the size of a given cohort 
has strong effects over the behavior of its neighbors, at the very least we will encounter 
problems with the independence of observations, and may even find biased answers to 
the extent that these cohort sizes are correlated. 
  Issues of multicollinearity prevent us from simply controlling for the size of the 
preceding and following cohort, because these neighboring cohorts will be highly 
correlated with the size of one’s own cohort in the data.  As a way of getting around this 
                                                 
22 Additional analysis not presented here draws on the extension of the model presented here in Hanson and  
McIntosh (2010).  This work explicitly considers the role of network effects, showing that the dynamic 
adjustment path of migration as a given cohort ages presents a tension between the dampening effects of 
wage arbitrage on further migration (which would decrease the effect of a shock with age) and the 
formation of  migration networks with peers as your cohort is increasingly in that destination.  Our results 
here show little heterogeneity in the impact of shocks across cohort age, indicating that these two forces on 
average are in balance both in the overall sample and to the US specifically.   30 
problem, we calculate the growth rate from the previous cohort to this one, and the 
growth rate from this cohort to the next, and control for these rates rather than for the raw 
cohort size itself.  Table 10 repeats the analysis of Table 6 using aggregated cohorts and 
controlling for these cross-cohort growth rates.  No significant effects of the size of 
adjacent cohorts are found in the US (the only country in which the raw effects are 
significant) and while the coefficient on the growth rate from the last cohort to the current 
one is significant in the overall sample, it is not significantly negative in any individual 
country.  Most importantly, the coefficient estimates on the contemporaneous effects 
remain very stable when we control for cross-cohort effects.  Hence we find no evidence 
that spillover effects across cohorts are likely to be causing major measurement errors.   
  A similar concern could arise in our analysis of shocks if it were the case that 
countries that had shocks in one period always had them in later periods, or if the impact 
of the shocks themselves displayed sufficient persistence.  To analyze this Table 11 
calculates annualized shock variables over the preceding census interval and includes 
them in a specification similar to Table 7.  We find natural disasters to be the only type of 
shock with any persistence in migration impacts, but the lagged effects are always of the 
same sign and with a reduced magnitude from the original shock.  The heterogeneity 
observable in the response to shocks for migration to the US is very similar in the 
response to lagged shocks.  Again, inclusion of these lags does not change our overall 
read on the results, which is that natural disasters disproportionately increase migration to 
the US and political shocks increase it to the other destinations. 
  In unreported results, we examined whether the results may be driven by Mexico, 
which is the largest source country for immigrants in the US.  All of our results are robust   31 
to dropping Mexico from the estimation sample.  In other results, we considered whether 
the importance of agriculture may mediate the impact of labor market shocks.  Since the 
supply of agricultural land is relatively inelastic, increases in labor supply may have a 
more negative effect on wages in agriculture dependent economies than in economies 
specialized in manufacturing (which is intensive in relatively elastic capital).  We found 
no evidence that the level of agricultural development in origin countries, on its own or 
interacted with labor supply or labor demand shocks, matters for emigration. 
   
5   DISCUSSION 
We intersect data on the size of birth cohorts in origin countries with data on the 
size of immigrant stocks by age and origin country in the US, Canada, Spain and UK to 
examine factors associated with emigration from 25 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries over the period 1980 to 2005.  We find that for migration to the US labor 
supply shocks, in the form of abnormally large or small birth cohorts, are a significant 
push factor, while they are uncorrelated with migration to Canada, Spain, or UK.  The 
effect of labor supply shocks decreases with distance from the destination for the case of 
the US but not for the other countries.   
  Our cohort panel data cover a long time span over a broad set of countries and 
therefore provide a good platform for examining how large but relatively rare shocks may 
contribute to migration.  We find that natural disasters and balance of payments crises 
increase the impact of labor supply shocks on migration to the US, but not to the other 
destinations, whereas civil and military conflict have the reverse effect, decreasing 
migration to the US but raising it to Canada, Spain and the UK.       
  These results draw a picture of one destination, the US, that is uniquely engaged   32 
in a demographic dance with its neighbors.  Inaccessibility by land, along with 
immigration regimes that are more formulaic and asylum-based, have effectively turned 
off a susceptibility to labor supply-driven migration in Canada, the UK, and Spain.  The 
United States displays a similar insensitivity with respect to the far-off countries of South 
America.  With its close neighbors, migration rates to the US respond strongly to  
shocks; larger or richer cohorts are most likely to migrate to the US, with this sensitivity 
heightened by economic volatility in the destination.   33 
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Appendix 
A.   Deriving the estimating equation 
Using equations (3), (5), and (6), we solve for the t = 0 emigration rate, and then iterate 
forward, solving for the wage and emigration rate in each period.  After some algebra, the 
emigration rate to country A for age group i in period t can be shown to be, 
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                      (A1)   
where there is a continuing series of high-order interactions of the model coefficients up 
to the power t-1.  The expression for country B is analogous.  While the expression 
appears complicated, the determinants of current emigration from the source country are 
simply initial wage differences between the origin and the two destinations,  0
A
i ω  and  0
B
i ω .  
The large number of terms in (A1) comes from the fact that positive emigration occurs 
only along the transition from an initial period in which there are large international wage 
differences to a final equilibrium of small wage differences.
23
 
  Migration from the origin 
country to destination A today affects migration to B tomorrow, which affects migration 
to A in the following period, and so on.  Since these higher order effects depend on a 
minimum of four-way interactions in the labor demand elasticity and labor supply 
elasticities (which are each less than one in absolute value), they are likely to be very 
small in practice; to simplify the expression, we exclude these terms. 
To interpret (A1), consider each term in the expression.  The first term on the right 
indicates that the current emigration rate to country A is higher the larger is the initial 
wage gap between the origin country and destination-country A.  Note that the emigration 
rate declines over time (owing to the assumption that 11
A +ησ < ), as the exodus of labor 
pushes up source-country wages.  The second term on the right indicates that the current 
emigration rate to country A is lower the larger is the initial wage gap between the source 
country and destination-country B, as the availability of an alternative location siphons 
off migrants who would have otherwise gone to A.  The terms on the second and third 
lines of (A1) are the initial terms in a series of higher order effects, which capture the 
implications for current migration to country A of how past migration to country A has 
affected migration to country B and of how past migration to country B has affected 
migration to country A.  Excluding the higher-order terms and using the approximation 
that (1+x)
t ≈ 1+tx, we can rewrite (A1) in much simpler form as 
 
                                                 
23 Because of the migration disamenity, international wage differences may not be fully eliminated.   36 
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Plugging in the determinants of the initial wage differential in (6), we obtain, 
  (A3)    𝜈𝑖𝑡
𝐴 = 𝑙𝑛ℓ𝑖0
𝐴 [𝜃𝐴 + (𝜃𝐴)2(𝑡 − 1)] + [𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖0
𝐴 − 𝐹𝐴][𝜎𝐴 + 𝜎𝐴𝜃𝐴(𝑡 − 1)]  
  
                                  +𝑙𝑛ℓ𝑖0
𝐵 𝜃𝐵𝜃𝐴(𝑡 − 1) + [𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖0
𝐵 − 𝐹𝐵]𝜎𝐵𝜃𝐴(𝑡 − 1) 
where  0
cc θ = ησ < .  Equations (A2) and (A3) are the basis for estimation. 
   
B.   No. of usable bilateral migration rates (five year birth cohorts) 
 
Destination Country: 
Origin Country:  Canada  Spain  UK  USA 
Antigua-Barbuda  10  0  0  16 
Bahamas  10  0  0  15 
Belize  10  0  8  18 
Bolivia  10  5  0  18 
Barbados  10  0  8  16 
Chile  10  9  0  18 
Colombia  10  5  0  18 
Costa Rica  10  5  0  18 
Dominican Republic  10  5  0  18 
Ecuador  10  5  0  18 
Grenada  2  0  0  5 
Guatemala  10  5  0  18 
Guyana  10  0  8  16 
Honduras  10  5  0  18 
Haiti  10  0  0  18 
Jamaica  10  0  8  18 
Mexico  10  9  0  18 
Nicaragua  10  5  0  18 
Panama  10  5  0  18 
Peru  10  9  0  18 
Paraguay  10  5  0  17 
El Salvador  10  5  0  18 
Trinidad & Tobago  10  0  8  18 
Uruguay  10  5  0  17 
Venezuela  10  9  0  18 
          Total  252  96  40  444 Table 1:  Emigration from Developing Countries, 2000 
           
    Emigration to high income countries  Emigration to all countries 
   Population  Emigrants  Emigration rate  Emigrants  Emigration rate 
East Asia & Pacific  1,804,027,262  12,315,945  0.0068  16,646,474  0.0092 
           
Europe & Central Asia  444,417,646  11,096,197  0.0250  40,475,642  0.0911 
           
Latin America & Caribbean  513,924,769  19,446,628  0.0378  24,212,595  0.0471 
           
Middle East & North Africa  276,357,816  8,359,017  0.0302  12,914,533  0.0467 
           
South Asia  1,358,784,470  8,794,178  0.0065  23,906,281  0.0176 
           
Sub-Saharan Africa  672,823,767  4,291,261  0.0064  17,434,890  0.0259 
 
High-income countries include Canada and the US; Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland; Australia, Hong Kong, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Japan; and Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.  Source:  Authors’ calculations based on data 
from Parsons, Skeldon, Walmsley, and Winters (2007).Table 2:  Emigration rates in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2000 
 
Origin Country  Emigration rate 
Share of emigrants from 
US, Can, Spain, UK 
Antigua & Barbuda  0.625  0.562 
Bahamas  0.124  0.895 
Barbados  0.401  0.852 
Dominican Republic  0.111  0.828 
Grenada  0.678  0.711 
Haiti  0.096  0.643 
Jamaica  0.371  0.884 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.258  0.878 
Mexico  0.105  0.928 
Belize  0.214  0.857 
Costa Rica  0.030  0.736 
El Salvador  0.163  0.871 
Guatemala  0.055  0.835 
Honduras  0.058  0.822 
Nicaragua  0.107  0.448 
Panama  0.066  0.820 
Argentina  0.017  0.410 
Bolivia  0.047  0.188 
Brazil  0.006  0.304 
Chile  0.036  0.249 
Colombia  0.040  0.443 
Ecuador  0.058  0.768 
Guyana  0.503  0.840 
Paraguay  0.079  0.053 
Peru  0.029  0.491 
Uruguay  0.076  0.233 
Venezuela  0.015  0.558 
Total  0.051  0.754 
 
The emigration rate is the share of emigrants (as measured by Parsons et al., 2007) in the 
total population.  Very small countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are excluded. 
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Table 3:   
Average stock of migrants from each origin to each destination, latest year 
 
 
% of Cohort in Destination Country: 
Origin Country:  Canada  Spain  UK  USA 
Antigua-Barbuda  1.98     5.02  19.51 
Bahamas  0.68 
 
4.82  14.48 
Belize  0.75 
 
1.75  10.47 
Bolivia  0.03  4.47  0.05  0.58 
Barbados  2.77 
 
9.28  13.38 
Chile  0.16  1.00  0.15  0.53 
Colombia  0.04  3.41 
 
1.04 
Costa Rica  0.10  0.13  0.07  2.75 
Dominican Republic  0.06  4.41  0.03  6.88 
Ecuador  0.08  17.81  0.13  2.58 
Grenada  5.40 
 
5.09  15.40 
Guatemala  0.12  0.06  0.01  5.69 
Guyana  5.60 
 
2.92  18.72 
Honduras  0.08  0.48  0.03  6.52 
Haiti  0.43 
 
0.01  3.47 
Jamaica  3.18 
 
7.78  14.39 
Mexico  0.04  0.07  0.03  11.55 
Nicaragua  0.19  0.19  0.02  3.11 
Panama  0.10  0.21  0.09  3.74 
Peru  0.06  2.27  0.07  1.12 
Paraguay  0.07  1.63  0.02  0.31 
El Salvador  0.57  0.18  0.03  14.35 
Trinidad & Tobago  3.44 
 
4.56  11.98 
Uruguay  0.18  6.19  0.13  1.81 












Notes:  The years for which the above figures correspond are 2001 for Canada and the 
UK, 2005 for the US, and 2007 for Spain.     40 
Table 4:  Average annualized net migration rates (fraction of a percent)  




Origin Country:  Canada  Spain  UK  USA 
Antigua-Barbuda  0.073        -0.281 
Bahamas  0.001 
   
0.224 
Belize  0.020 
 
0.027  -0.280 
Bolivia  0.001  0.624 
 
0.032 
Barbados  0.031 
 
0.346  0.179 
Chile  0.001  0.081 
 
0.021 
Colombia  0.003  0.212 
 
0.027 
Costa Rica  0.003  -0.013 
 
0.180 
Dominican Republic  0.002  0.366 
 
0.186 
Ecuador  0.003  1.347 
 
0.132 
Grenada  0.434 
   
0.976 
Guatemala  0.004  -0.003 
 
0.380 
Guyana  0.173 
 
0.107  0.974 
Honduras  0.002  0.047 
 
0.462 
Haiti  0.014 
   
0.129 
Jamaica  0.081 
 
0.481  0.215 
Mexico  0.002  0.000 
 
0.505 
Nicaragua  0.001  0.021 
 
-0.020 
Panama  0.000  -0.028 
 
0.059 
Peru  0.003  0.250 
 
0.076 
Paraguay  -0.001  0.242 
 
0.023 
El Salvador  0.009  0.014 
 
0.670 
Trinidad & Tobago  0.081 
 
0.230  0.347 
Uruguay  0.003  0.499 
 
0.247 
Venezuela  0.002  -0.098     0.038 
 
Notes:  The years for which the above figures correspond are 2001 for Canada and the 
UK, 2005 for the US, and 2007 for Spain.     41 
Table 5:  Annualized values of shocks 
   
Origin Country: 
# of Serious 
Natural 
Disasters 






Antigua-Barbuda  0.05  0.00    
Bahamas  0.04  0.00  0.00 
Belize  0.05  0.00  0.00 
Bolivia  0.13  0.03  0.00 
Barbados  0.00  0.03  0.00 
Chile  0.16  0.11  0.00 
Colombia  0.02  0.09  0.42 
Costa Rica  0.10  0.06  0.00 
Dom. Republic  0.04  0.00  0.04 
Ecuador  0.34  0.07  0.00 
Grenada  0.00  0.00 
  Guatemala  0.15  0.00  0.26 
Guyana  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Honduras  0.18  0.00  0.08 
Haiti  0.04  0.00  0.00 
Jamaica  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Mexico  0.42  0.12  0.00 
Nicaragua  0.20  0.03  0.23 
Panama  0.00  0.04  0.00 
Peru  0.18  0.04  0.31 
Paraguay  0.00  0.04  0.00 
El Salvador  0.12  0.01  0.31 
Trin. & Tobago  0.00  0.03  0.00 
Uruguay  0.00  0.04  0.00 
Venezuela  0.03  0.04    
 
# of Serious Natural Disasters:  The sum, over census intervals, of earthquakes over 
7.5 Richter, windstorms lasting a week or more, or landslides or volcano eruptions 
affecting more than 1000 people. 
 
# of Sudden Stops:  The sum, over census intervals, of Sudden Stops 1-4 from Cavallo 
(2007), defined as a year-on-year fall in the current account surplus of at least two 
standard deviations from the sample mean, with the standard deviation calculated four 
alternative ways. 
 
Civil Conflict:  Calculated as the number of years between census intervals in which a 
serious conflict exists (Extra-state, Intra-state, Internal, or Internationalized Internal) 
that killed over 1000 people in a country. 
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Table 6:  Partitioned results on bilateral migration rates  
 
   
 
Dependent Variable:              
Annualized migration rate over 
census interval, percent.
USA CAN USA CAN SPN UK
Log Birth Cohort Size Ratio 0.430 0.014 0.404 0.016 -0.191 -0.261
(4.76)** (1.23) (4.14)** (1.18) (1.10) (2.14)
Log GDP pc Ratio at Age 16 0.145 0.011 0.157 0.012 -0.031 -0.056
(2.18)* (1.90) (2.08)* (1.76) (0.72) (1.59)
Log GDP pc in year of census -0.00003 0.00000 -0.00003 0.00000 0.00002 -0.00020
(0.53) (0.35) (0.55) (0.36) (0.06) (1.77)
Years since cohort turned 16 0.037 0.001 -0.027 -0.001 0.017 0.008
(2.45)* (1.65) (0.67) (0.62) (1.33) (0.97)
Years since 16 squared -0.0014 0.0000 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0005
(2.14)* (1.86) (2.33)* (1.72) (1.99) (1.19)
Observations 1804 1082 444 252 96 40
* significant at 95%, ** significant at 99%, t-statistics in parentheses and SEs clustered by origin/destination dyad.
Birth country, birth cohort, and census wave fixed effects included in all specifications.  Regressions are weighted by 
the size of the birth cohort.  
One-year Birth 
Cohorts Five-year Birth Cohorts  43 
 
Table 7:  Effects of distance from the US and Canada on bilateral migration rates 
 
 
   
  
Dependent Variable:                                

















Supply  Distance  
Distance  





Log Birth Cohort Size Ratio  0.672  0.485  0.012  0.012  0.077  0.121  0.166  0.073 
(4.26)**  (3.00)**  (1.20)  (1.16)  (1.44)  (2.17)*  (1.71)  (1.34) 
Log GDP pc Ratio at Age 16  0.051  -0.042  0.010  0.011  0.034  0.031  0.034  0.015 
(0.70)  (0.41)  (1.62)  (1.67)  (0.76)  (0.66)  (0.70)  (0.33) 
Log Birth Cohort Ratio * Distance  -0.072  0.0005  -0.014 
(1.79)  (0.37)  (0.94) 
Log Birth Cohort Ratio * Island  -0.436  -0.650  -0.008  -0.002  -0.112  0.062  -0.043  -0.100 
   (2.37)*  (3.76)**  (1.08)  (0.24)  (3.02)**  (1.45)  (0.97)  (1.21) 
Log Birth Cohort Ratio   -0.0636  0.00108 
          * Countries Crossed  (3.91)**  (0.90) 
Birth Cohort Ratio, US Only  0.128  0.278  0.141 
(3.94)**  (4.27)**  (4.48)** 
Dyadic Distance  -0.041  -0.012 
   (0.67)  (0.25) 
Dyadic Distance, US Only  -0.098  -0.245 
(4.20)**  (5.08)** 
Birth Cohort Ratio * Distance, US only  -0.055 
(4.12)** 
Island, US Only   -0.830 
   (3.75)** 
Birth Cohort Ratio * Island , US only  -0.257 
(6.56)** 
Observations  1804  1804  1082  1082  3022  3022  3022  3022 
* significant at 95%, ** significant at 99%, t-statistics in parentheses and SEs clustered by origin/destination dyad. 
USA  Canada 
All regressions use birth year, origin country, and census year fixed effects plus linear and quadratic age terms.  The pooled 
regressions include destination fixed effects.  Regressions are weighted by the size of the birth cohort.  .   
  
All Destinations Pooled   44 
Table 8:  Economic and political shocks and bilateral migration rates 
 
 
Dependent Variable:                       
Annualized migration rate over census  
interval, percent. 
Log Birth Cohort Size Ratio  0.116  0.076  0.047  0.152  0.062  0.054 
(1.61)  (1.23)  (0.59)  (1.72)  (0.71)  (0.58) 
Log GDP pc Ratio at Age 16  0.025  -0.097  0.046  0.097  0.036  -0.018 
(0.47)  (1.57)  (0.88)  (1.64)  (0.55)  (0.29) 
Shock  -2.373  -82.024  -0.793  -1.701  0.255  0.151 
-0.64  (2.26)*  (1.61)  (1.87)  (2.48)*  (0.42) 
Shock, US only  10.962  203.542  1.205  3.285  -0.404  -1.237 
(1.46)  (3.53)**  (1.81)  (3.55)**  (2.81)**  (2.21)* 
Cohort Size Ratio * Shock  -14.819  -1.034  0.156 
(2.94)**  (4.39)**  (1.44) 
GDP Ratio * Shock  1.852  -1.066  0.013 
(0.20)  (3.11)**  (0.08) 
Cohort Size Ratio * Shock, US only  27.480  1.394  -0.498 
(4.64)**  (4.49)**  (5.21)** 
GDP Ratio * Shock, US only  12.127  1.462  -0.108 
(0.80)  (3.67)**  (0.50) 
Years since cohort turned 16  -0.006  0.014  -0.061  -0.047  -0.051  -0.028 
-0.18  (0.52)  (2.74)**  (2.26)*  (2.21)*  (1.08) 
Years since 16 squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
(1.52)  (1.63)  (1.56)  (1.69)  (1.63)  (1.74) 
Observations  832  832  724  724  642  642 
p-value on F-Test that the shock or the  
interaction between the shock and the  
cohort size effect is significant in U.S.: 
0.0004  0.0036  0.1540  0.0253  0.1057  0.0022 
* significant at 95%, ** significant at 99%, t-statistics in parentheses and SEs clustered by origin/destination dyad. 
# of Sudden Stops is the sum, over census intervals, of Sudden Stops 1-4 from Cavallo data, defined as a fall in the  
CA surplus of at least 2 SD from sample mean, with standard deviations calculated four different ways. 
Civil Conflict is from CSCW Monadic Armed Conflict data, calculated as the number of years between census 
intervals  in which a serious conflict exists (Extra-state, Intra-state, Internal, or Internationalized Internal) that killed 
over 1000 people in the sending country.    
Type of Shock: 
Annualized # of Serious  
Natural Disasters           
(per '000 square km.) 
Annualized # of Sudden  
Stops 
Annualized  Civil  
Conflict 
All regressions calculated using five-year birthyear cohorts, with birth cohort, birth country, destination country, and  
census wave  fixed effects included in all specifications.  Interactions of Cohort Size ratio*US only and GDP ratio*US  
are included in columns 2,4,and 6 but not reported.  Regressions are weighted by the size of the birth cohort.   
 
 
# of Serious Natural Disasters is the sum, over census intervals, of earthquakes over 7.5 Richter, windstorms lasting a  
week or more, or landslides or volcano eruptions affecting more than 1000 people in sending country.   45 
Table 9:  Migration networks and bilateral migration rates 
 
 
   
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable:                       
Annualized migration rate over census  
interval, percent. 
Basic 
Migrant     
Stocks 
Labor  
Supply &  
Migrant  
Stocks 
 US       
Migrant  
Stocks 
Log Birth Cohort Size   0.114  0.088  -0.053  0.106 
(1.84)  (1.86)  (0.55)  (2.33)* 
Log GDP pc Ratio at Age 16  0.038  0.020  -0.052  0.036 
(0.67)  (0.39)  (0.45)  (0.72) 
GDP pc as of year of census  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.34  (0.25)  (0.31)  (0.43) 
Years since 16  -0.021  -0.029  -0.028  -0.017 
(0.59)  (1.03)  (0.98)  (0.62) 
Years since 16 squared  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
(1.61)  (1.63)  (1.65)  (1.67) 
Log earliest observable stock of migrants  0.108  0.124  0.059 
(6.52)**  (6.82)**  (2.70)** 
Earliest stock * Log Birth Cohort Size  0.013 
(1.80) 
Earliest stock * LogGDP Ratio  0.007 
(0.69) 
US * Earliest stock  0.065 
(4.31)** 
Observations  832  832  832  832 
Weighted mean of dependent variable in Canada (omitted country): .006 
All regressions calculated using five-year birthyear cohorts, with birth country, birth cohort,  
destination, and census wave fixed effects.  Regressions are weighted by the size of the birth  
cohort.   
* significant at 95%, ** significant at 99%, t-statistics in parentheses and SEs clustered by  
origin/destination dyad.   46 
 
Table 10:  Effect of adjacent cohorts on bilateral migration rates 
 
 
Dependent Variable:                      
Annualized migration rate over 
census interval, percent.
All USA CAN SPN UK
Log Birth Cohort Size Ratio 0.071 0.473 0.026 -0.508 0.008
(0.97) (4.16)** (1.26) (1.92) (0.03)
Log GDP pc Ratio at Age 16 0.022 0.186 0.013 -0.091 -0.053
(0.41) (3.45)** (1.75) (1.70) (0.74)
Log GDP pc in year of census 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.36) (0.64) (0.33) (0.10) (1.03)
Log origin birth cohort size, (next/this) 7.343 24.069 4.452 -6.899 6.438
(1.19) (0.89) (1.24) (1.58) (1.92)
Log origin birth cohort size, (this/last) -12.286 -58.153 -4.183 7.842 -1.264
(1.87) (2.05) (1.33) (2.19)* (0.52)
Years since cohort turned 16 -0.021 -0.023 -0.001 0.009 0.013
-0.59 (0.58) (0.55) (0.53) (1.03)
Years since 16 squared -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(1.61) (2.35)* (1.74) (1.68) (0.74)
Observations 805 443 252 80 30
All regressions calculated using five-year birthyear cohorts.  Birth country, birth cohort, and census 
wave fixed effects included in all specifications, plus Destination country FE in the first column.  
Regressions are weighted by the size of the birth cohort.  
* significant at 95%, ** significant at 99%, t-statistics in parentheses and SEs clustered by 
origin/destination dyad.  47 





      
 
   
Dependent Variable:                       
Annualized migration rate over census  
interval, percent. 
Log Birth Cohort Size Ratio  0.173  0.089  0.436  0.367  0.377  0.356 
(1.61)  (0.50)  (2.89)**  (1.95)  (2.01)  (1.88) 
Log GDP pc Ratio at Age 16  0.035  0.038  0.163  0.155  0.145  0.121 
(0.37)  (0.32)  (1.90)  (1.55)  (1.19)  (0.80) 
Shock  -0.337  -0.407  -0.417  -1.312  0.287  0.857 
-1.93  (0.37)  (1.19)  (1.22)  (2.44)*  (1.02) 
Shock, US only  0.677  1.228  0.842  0.821  -0.398  -0.642 
(3.68)**  (2.56)*  (1.43)  (0.72)  (2.72)**  (2.18)* 
Lagged Shock  -0.234  -0.388  -1.006  0.578  0.036  0.123 
(3.49)**  (1.48)  (1.25)  (0.97)  (0.26)  (0.22) 
Lagged Shock, US Only  0.256  1.269  -0.107 
(2.96)**  (1.67)  (0.76) 
Age  0.004  -0.012  -0.033  -0.023  -0.027  -0.030 
-0.08  (0.18)  (0.89)  (0.67)  (0.80)  (0.77) 
Age Squared  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
(2.26)*  (2.17)*  (1.60)  (0.93)  (0.53)  (1.00) 
Cohort Size Ratio * Shock  0.177  -0.084  -0.141 
(0.75)  (0.30)  (1.08) 
GDP Ratio * Shock  0.065  -0.358  0.268 
(0.15)  (0.88)  (0.77) 
Cohort Size Ratio * Lagged Shock  0.006  -0.055  0.056 
(0.09)  (0.29)  (1.10) 
GDP Ratio * Lagged Shock  -0.191  0.232  0.018 
(1.06)  (0.72)  (0.09) 
Observations  515  515  434  434  376  376 
* significant at 95%, ** significant at 99%, t-statistics in parentheses and SEs clustered by origin/destination dyad. 
All regressions calculated using five-year birthyear cohorts, with birth cohort, birth country, destination country, and  
census wave  fixed effects included in all specifications.  Interactions of Cohort Size ratio*US only and GDP ratio*US 
are included in columns 2, 4, and 6 but not reported.  Regressions are weighted by the size of the birth cohort.  .   
# of Serious Natural Disasters is the sum, over census intervals, of earthquakes over 7.5 Richter, windstorms lasting a  
week or more, or landslides or volcano eruptions affecting more than 1000 people in sending country. 
# of Sudden Stops is the the sum, over census intervals, of Sudden Stops 1-4 from Cavallo data, defined as a fall in the  
CA surplus of at least 2 SD from sample mean, with standard deviations calculated four different ways. 
Civil Conflict is from CSCW Monadic Armed Conflict data, calculated as the number of years between census 
internals in which a serious conflict exists (Extra-state, Intra-state, Internal, or Internationalized Internal) that killed 
over 1000 people in the sending country.    
 
Type of Shock: 
Annualized # of Serious  
Natural Disasters 
Annualized # of Sudden  
Stops 
Annualized  Civil  
Conflict   48 
Figure 1:  Number of births by country, 1960-2005 
(a) Smaller Caribbean Basin Countries 
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